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ARE FOREIGN NATIONALS ENTITLED TO 
THE SAME CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
AS CITIZENS? 
David Cole* 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the federal government has targeted foreign nationals for its 
most invasive security measures. Foreign nationals alone are 
subject to trial by military tribunal if accused of terrorist crimes. 
Thousands of foreign nationals have been detained under terror-
ist-related initiatives, most conducted under the rubric of the im-
migration law. Foreign nationals have been subjected to 
selective interrogation, registration, detention, and deportation 
on the basis of their national identity. Foreign nationals were the 
targets of the most extreme provisions in the USA PATRIOT 
Act, enacted six weeks after September 11, 2001. In short, in 
striking the balance between liberty and security, we have 
adopted the easy choice of sacrificing the liberties of a vulnerable 
minority - foreign nationals, and especially Arab and Muslim 
foreign nationals - for the purported security of the majority.1 
One of the most common responses to this criticism is to 
assert that foreign nationals do not deserve the same rights as 
American citizens, and that therefore treating them differently is 
legitimate as a constitutional and normative matter. That re-
sponse strikes a chord with the widely shared assumption that 
citizenship makes a difference, and that the difference warrants 
the distinct treatment that foreign nationals receive. Thus, when 
President Bush issued the military order authorizing military 
tribunals, Vice President Cheney defended its limitation to for-
eign nationals in the following terms: 
[S]omebody who comes into the United States of America il-
legally, who conducts a terrorist operation killing thousands of 
innocent Americans - men, women, and children - is not a 
lawful combatant .... They don't deserve the same guaran-
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. This article is adapted from a 
chapter in DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 1-82 (2003). 
1. I set out this critique in detail in David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
953 (2002), and in DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003). 
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tees and safeguards that would be used for an American citi-
zen going through the normal judicial process.2 
The view that foreign nationals do not deserve the same con-
stitutional protections as U.S. citizens was given some support in 
April 2003 when a divided Supreme Court in Demore v. Kim3 
upheld a 1996 statute imposing mandatory detention on foreign 
nationals charged with being deportable for having committed 
certain crimes. The statute at issue mandated detention pending 
the adjudication of the deportation hearing even where, as in 
Kim's case, the government agreed that detention was not neces-
sary, because the individual posed neither a flight risk nor a dan-
ger and could be released on bond. For the first time ever 
outside the war setting, the Court in Kim upheld categorical pre-
ventive detention without any individualized assessment of the 
need for detention. And the majority did so by expressly invok-
ing a double standard, claiming that in regUlating immigration, 
"Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if 
applied to citizens."4 Yet fifty years earlier, the Court had stated 
that the Due Process Clause does not "acknowledge[] any dis-
tinction between citizens and resident aliens."5 
Are foreign nationals entitled only to reduced rights and 
freedoms? The difficulty of the question is reflected in the 
deeply ambivalent approach of the Supreme Court, an ambiva-
lence matched only by the alternately xenophobic and xenophilic 
attitude of the American public toward immigrants. On the one 
hand, the Court has insisted for more than a century that foreign 
nationals living among us are "persons" within the meaning of 
the Constitution, and are protected by those rights that the Con-
stitution does not expressly reserve to citizens. Because the Con-
stitution expressly limits to citizens only the rights to vote and to 
run for federal elective office, equality between non-nationals 
and citizens would appear to be the constitutional rule. 
On the other hand, the Court has permitted foreign nation-
als to be excluded and expelled because of their race.6 It has 
2. Elisabeth Bumiller & Steven Lee Myers, Senior Administration Officials De-
fend Military Tribunals for Terrorist Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,2001, at B6. 
3. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
4. [d. (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)). 
5. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598 n.5 (1953). 
6. The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher), 189 U.S. 86 (1903); The 
Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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allowed them to be deported for political associations that were 
entirely lawful at the time they were engaged in? It has upheld 
laws barring foreign nationals from owning land, even where the 
laws were a transparent cover for anti-Japanese racism.s It has 
permitted the indefinite detention of "arriving aliens" stopped at 
the border on the basis of secret evidence that they could not 
confront.9 And it has allowed states to bar otherwise qualified 
foreign nationals from employment as public school teachers and 
police officers, based solely on their status as foreigners. lO 
Given this record, it is not surprising that many members of 
the general public presume that noncitizens do not deserve the 
same rights as citizens. II But the presumption is wrong in many 
more respects than it is right. While some distinctions between 
foreign nationals and citizens are normatively justified and con-
sistent with constitutional and international law, most are not. 
The significance of the citizen/noncitizen distinction is more 
often presumed than carefully examined. Upon examination, 
there is far less to the distinction than commonly thought. In 
particular, foreign nationals are generally entitled to the equal 
protection of the laws, to political freedoms of speech and associ-
ation, and to due process requirements of fair procedure where 
their lives, liberty, or property are at stake. 
7. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954). 
8. Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923) (upholding Washington's alien land 
law); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (upholding California's alien land 
law). In 1948, the Court invalidated California's law as applied to a U.S. citizen 
child of a Japanese national. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). And in 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), the Court invalidated a 
California law barring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to Japanese resident 
aliens, but expressly distinguished the alien land laws. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 422. 
Thus, "the U.S. Supreme Court technically never found the [alien land] laws uncon-
stitutional." Brant T. Lee, A Racial Trust: The Japanese YWCA and the Alien Land 
Law, 7 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1,28 (2001). 
9. Shaughnessy v. United States ex reI. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
10. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (permitting states to require citizen-
ship in hiring state troopers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (permitting 
states to require citizenship in hiring public school teachers); Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (permitting states to require citizenship in hiring of dep-
uty probation officers). 
11. A November 2001 poll conducted by National Public Radio, Harvard Univer-
sity's John F. Kennedy School of Government, and the Kaiser Family Foundation 
found that 56 percent of those surveyed said that noncitizens visiting or living legally 
in the United States should have different rights than U.S. citizens. The question 
specifically excepted the right to vote or hold public office. Deborah L. Acomb, Poll 
Track for December 15, 2001, NAT'L J., Dec. 15,2001. 
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The Constitution does distinguish in some respects between 
the rights of citizens and noncitizens: the right not to be discrimi-
natorily denied the vote and the right to run for federal elective 
office are expressly restricted to citizens.12 All other rights, how-
ever, are written without such a limitation. The Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendment due process and equal protection guarantees 
extend to all "persons." The rights attaching to criminal trials, 
including the right to a public trial, a trial by jury, the assistance 
of a lawyer, and the right to confront adverse witnesses, all apply 
to "the accused." And both the First Amendment's protections 
of political and religious freedoms and the Fourth Amendment's 
protection of privacy and liberty apply to "the people." 
The fact that the Framers chose to limit to citizens only the 
rights to vote and to run for federal office is one indication that 
they did not intend other constitutional rights to be so limited. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has squarely stated that neither 
the First Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment "acknowledges 
any distinction between citizens and resident aliens."13 For more 
than a century, the Court has recognized that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is "universal in [its] application, to all persons within 
the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to differences of ... 
nationality."14 The Court has repeatedly stated that "the Due 
Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, 
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, 
temporary, or permanent."15 When noncitizens, no matter what 
their status, are tried for crimes, they are entitled to all of the 
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; U.S. CON ST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. 15. 
The Constitution's limitation to citizens of the right against discriminatory denial of 
the vote does not mean that noncitizens cannot vote. If a state or locality chooses to 
enfranchise its noncitizen residents, it may do so. Indeed, until the early twentieth 
century, noncitizens routinely enjoyed the right to vote as a matter of state and local 
law. By contrast, the Constitution expressly restricts to citizens the right to hold 
federal elective office. 
13. Chew, supra note 5, at 596 n.5 (1953) (construing immigration regulation per-
mitting exclusion of aliens based on secret evidence not to apply to a returning per-
manent resident alien because of the substantial constitutional concerns that such an 
application would present). 
14. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
15. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); see also Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 
(holding that due process applies to all aliens in the United States, even those whose 
presence is "unlawful, involuntary, or transitory"). 
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rights that attach to the criminal process, without any distinction 
based on their nationality.16 
There are strong normative reasons for the uniform exten-
sion of these fundamental rights. As James Madison himself ar-
gued, those subject to the obligations of our legal system ought to 
be entitled to its protections: 
[I]t does not follow, because aliens are not parties to the Con-
stitution, as citizens are parties to it, that whilst they actually 
conform to it, they have no right to its protection. Aliens are 
not more parties to the laws, than they are parties to the Con-
stitution; yet it will not be disputed, that as they owe, on one 
hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to 
their protection and advantageP 
While Madison's view was not without its CrItIcs, his view 
prevailed in the long run.I8 On this view, the Constitution pre-
16. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). See also Bridges v. 
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy. J., concurring) (arguing that noncitizens 
are protected by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments); Wong Wing v. 
United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding that noncitizens charged with crimes are 
protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments); Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893) (observing that foreign nationals are entitled 
to all "the safeguards of the Constitution, and to the protection of the laws, in regard 
to their rights of person and of property, and to their civil and criminal responsibil-
ity"); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651,660 (1892) (noting that foreign 
nationals incarcerated here have a constitutional right to invoke habeas corpus). 
Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested some limitation on the rights of some foreign na-
tionals in the United States in his plurality opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990), in which he suggested that a Mexican citizen who 
had been involuntarily brought into this country for criminal prosecution was not 
part of "the people" eligible to invoke the Fourth Amendment. However, he was 
unable to gamer a majority for that view, and Justice Kennedy, whose vote was 
necessary to the majority in that case, expressly rejected Rehnquist's suggestion that 
the Fourth Amendment did not extend to all persons present in the United States. 
!d. at 276-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy rested instead on the fact 
that the search took place beyond our borders, a factor also relied upon by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist. [d. at 278. 
17. JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Taylor & Maury, 1836). 
18. The debate that accompanied the enactment and ultimate demise of the 
Alien and Sedition Acts suggests that there was in fact substantial disagreement 
about the status of foreign nationals' rights in the early years of the republic, at least 
in a time of crisis. Opponents of the Alien Act, mostly Republicans, pointed to the 
broad language of the Bill of Rights and the legal obligations imposed on all persons 
residing within our territory as support for the notion that foreign nationals were 
entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights. Others, mostly Federalists, main-
tained that the Constitution was a more limited social compact that protected only 
"we the people." See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: 
IMMIGRANTS. BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 52-63 (1996). But as with the 
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sumptively extends not just to citizens, but to all who are subject 
to American legal obligations, and certainly to all persons within 
the United States. Madison's view is buttressed by the fact that 
when adopted, the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights were 
viewed not as a set of optional contractual provisions enforceable 
because they were agreed upon by a group of states and ex-
tending only to the contracting parties, but as inalienable natural 
rights that found their provenance in GOd.19 
While natural law theories hold less influence today, the 
human rights movement of the last fifty years reflects a remarka-
bly parallel secular understanding, namely that there are certain 
basic human rights to which all persons are entitled, simply by 
virtue of their humanity. Human rights treaties, including those 
that the United States has signed and ratified, uniformly provide 
that the rights of due process, political freedoms, and equal pro-
tection are owed to all persons, regardless of nationality. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, aptly de-
scribed by Professor Richard Lillich as the "Magna Carta of con-
temporary international human rights law," is expressly premised 
on "the inherent dignity and ... the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family."20 Every international law 
scholar to consider the question has concluded that the Universal 
Declaration extends its rights to non-nationals and nationals 
alike.21 The Universal Declaration explicitly guarantees the 
rights of due process, political expression and association, and 
equal protection.22 
Sedition Act, so with the Alien Act, those espousing the more inclusive, rights-pro-
tective views ultimately prevailed, and the Alien Act sunsetted two years after its 
enactment. Cf New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964) (relying 
on history of repudiation of Sedition Act as evidence for importance of protecting 
political dissent under First Amendment). 
19. See generally Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987). 
20. RICHARD B. LILLICH. THE HUMAI-I RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (Manchester University Press 1984); Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d. Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, 
U.N. Doc. Al810 (1948). 
21. LILLICH, supra note 20, at 43; Baroness Elles, International Provisions Pro-
tecting the Human Rights of Non-Citizens at 45, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/392lRev.l, 
U.N. Sales No. E.80XrV.2 (1980); David Weissbrodt, Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Indigenous Peoples and Minorities: The Rights of Non-Citizens 
at 30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/20 (2001); CARMEN TIBURCIO, THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF ALIENS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (2001). 
22. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl., art. 7-11, 19,20(1). G.A. Res. 
217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
similarly extends its protections generally to noncitizens; the 
Human Rights Committee's authoritative commentary provides 
that "in general, the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to 
everyone ... and irrespective of his or her nationality or state-
lessness. "23 These principles are also reflected in the Declaration 
on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are Not Nationals of 
the Country in which They Live, adopted by the U.N. General 
Assembly in 1985. It expressly guarantees to non-nationals, 
among other rights, the right to life, the right not to be subjected 
to arbitrary arrest or torture, due process, equality before the 
courts, and the freedoms of thought, opinion, conscience, relig-
ion, and expression.24 The only civil and political rights that in-
ternational law does not generally guarantee on equal terms to 
citizens and non-nationals are the right to vote, the right to run 
for elective office, and the rights of entry and abode.25 
While domestic practices diverge in some respects, other na-
tions also generally recognize that foreign nationals are entitled 
to the same basic human rights as their own citizens. Some con-
stitutions, such as Sweden's, expressly guarantee equal rights and 
freedoms to non-nationals.26 Other constitutions, such as Ca-
nada's, guarantee basic human rights to "everyone," much as 
ours does to "persons," and have therefore been read to protect 
23. General Comment 15, The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, Human 
Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/I/Rev.l, at 18 (1994), 27th Sess. 1986, at 
para. 7; LILLICH, supra note 20, at 46; Weissbrodt, supra note 21, at 38-43. 
24. U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 252, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (December 
13, 1985). Interestingly, while international instruments generally prohibit discrimi-
nation on a number of grounds, including national origin, they generally do not ex-
pressly prohibit discrimination on grounds of nationality. '''[N]ational origin' refers 
to a person's descent, not to his juridical nationality." LILLICH, supra note 20, at 46. 
However, international scholars have nonetheless generally interpreted human 
rights treaties to bar nationality-based discrimination, except pursuant to otherwise 
lawful immigration restrictions, or in times of war, where necessary to defend the 
nation. See Weissbrodt, supra note 21, at 30, 37; Elles, supra note 21, at 299. 
25. B. G. Ramcharan, Equality and Nondiscrimination, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 246, 263 (Louis 
Henkin ed., 1981). 
26. Peter Nobel, The Alien Under Swedish Law, 11 COMPo L. Y.B. 165,168 (1992) 
(noting that "as far as constitutional rights and freedoms are concerned, the alien 
lawfully staying in Sweden is equal to the national in respect of the freedoms of 
expression, information, congregation, political and religious opinions, association, 
demonstration and all rules to protect integrity and rule of law as well as protection 
of property, material as well as immaterial"). 
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non-nationals living in the country.27 Italy's Constitution extends 
fundamental rights, including due process and the freedoms of 
speech and association, to all persons in Italy, even those who 
have entered illegally?8 Germany's Basic Law establishes 
"human rights" and "everyone's rights" that apply equally to all 
persons without regard to citizenship. The Basic Law does guar-
antee certain other freedoms, including the freedoms of assembly 
and of association, to Germans only, but these rights have been 
extended by statute to foreigners in the same manner as they ap-
ply to citizens.29 While Great Britain does not have a Constitu-
tion, it has recently incorporated the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) into its domestic law by statute, and the 
ECHR generally extends fundamental rights protection to all 
persons without regard to nationality?O 
The normative idea underlying this broad consensus is that 
fundamental rights are owed to persons as a matter of human 
dignity and should be honored no matter what form of govern-
ment a particular community chooses to adopt. As David Feld-
man has written, "there are certain kinds of treatment which are 
simply incompatible with the idea that one is dealing with a 
human being who, as such, is entitled to respect for his or her 
humanity and dignity."31 The rights of political freedom, due 
process, and equal protection are among the minimal rights that 
the world has come to demand of any society. In the words of 
the Supreme Court, these rights are "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty. "32 
27. See, e.g., Yamani v. Canada, [1995]1 F.e. 174 (Can.). 
28. LA COSTITUZION [Constitution] arts. 13, 14, 17-21, 24 (Italy); see BRUNO NAS-
CIMBENE, Lo STRANIERO NEL DIRITTO ITALIANO (1988); Cass., sez. Un., 21 Feb. 
2002, n.2513 (translated as "citizens of a country other than the EU ones do not only 
enjoy the fundamental human rights as provided for by national law, international 
conventions and common principles of international law, but also the principle of 
equal treatment as Italian citizens with respect to judicial guarantees and due pro-
cess of law"), available at http://www.cittadinolex.kataweb.it/ArticleI0.1519.18105-
1137,00.html (April 24, 2002). 
29. RUTH RUBIO-MARIN, IMMIGRATION AS A DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE; CITI· 
ZENSHIP AND INCLUSION IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 187-88 and n.16 
(2000). 
30. See LILLICH, supra note 20, at 94; Weissbrodt, supra note 21, at 24 (quoting 
INT'L CTR. FOR SOCIOLOGICAL, CRIMINAL AND PENITENTIAL RESEARCH AND STUD· 
IES (INTERCENTER), EXCLUSION, EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW AND NON-DIS· 
CRIMINATION 135 (1995)). 
31. David Feldman, Human Dignity as a Legal Value - Part I, 1999 Pub. L. 682, 
690-91. 
32. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
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Our own historical experience with restricting fundamental 
rights on the basis of citizenship should also give us pause about 
departing from uniformity.33 Chief Justice Taney's decision in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford34 sought to define away the rights of even 
free African Americans by concluding that "persons who are the 
descendants of Africans who were imported into this country, 
and sold as slaves," were not citizens and therefore could not in-
voke federal court jurisdiction.35 Chief Justice Taney reasoned 
that when the Constitution was adopted, blacks were not pro-
tected by its provisions, because they were "considered as a 
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subju-
gated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, 
yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or priv-
ileges but such as those who held the power and the Government 
might choose to grant them. "36 
With the express intent of overruling that reasoning, Con-
gress provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that "all persons 
born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, 
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of 
the United States ... .'037 The same Congress enacted the Four-
teenth Amendment, which similarly provided that all persons 
born or naturalized in the United States are citizens, and further 
guaranteed to all persons in the United States - whether citizens 
or not - due process of law and equal protection. As Yale Law 
Professor Alexander Bickel wrote, Dred Scott teaches that "[a] 
relationship between government and the governed that turns on 
citizenship can always be dissolved or denied [because] 
[c)itizenship is a legal construct, an abstraction, a theory."38 It is 
far more difficult to deny that a human being is a "person." 
The fact that noncitizens residing among us, even lawful per-
manent residents, lack the right to vote provides another reason 
for extending to foreign nationals the rights reflected in the Bill 
33. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33-54 (1975). 
34. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
35. [d. at 403. 
36. [d. at 404-405. This is almost the same language the Supreme Court used 
nearly one hundred years later when it held that Ellen Knauff, a German citizen 
seeking admission to the country, could assert no constitutional objection to the fact 
that she was being excluded on the basis of secret evidence because "[w)hatever the 
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry 
is concerned." United States ex reI. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
37. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 
38. BICKEL, supra note 33, at 53. 
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of Rights. Foreign nationals residing here must obey our laws 
and pay taxes; they are even subject to the draft.39 Yet because 
they lack the franchise, they are without a meaningful voice in 
the political bargains that govern their everyday lives. Members 
of Congress have little reason to concern themselves with the 
rights and interests of people who cannot vote. As Professor 
John Hart Ely has argued, non-nationals' interests will almost by 
definition be undercounted in the political process; as such, they 
are a "relatively easy case" of a "discrete and insular minority" 
deserving of heightened protection.40 Foreign nationals do enjoy 
some indirect representation, as co-ethnic groups and business 
interests may sometimes assert their rights, and foreign govern-
ments may use diplomatic pressure to protect their nationals in 
the United States. But such indirect representation is no substi-
tute for the vote. When one adds to this the ignoble history of 
anti-immigrant sentiment among the voting citizenry, often laced 
with racial animus, foreigners are a group particularly warranting 
judicial protection.41 The Supreme Court itself has acknowl-
edged this, writing that "[a]liens as a class are a prime example of 
a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom ... heightened judicial 
solicitude is appropriate. "42 
II. FREE SPEECH, DUE PROCESS, AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
The specific features of the constitutional guarantees of po-
litical freedom, due process, and equal protection further support 
their extension to foreign nationals living in the United States. 
The First Amendment, for example, protects even the speech of 
inanimate corporations on the instrumentalist ground that corpo-
rate speech contributes to the marketplace of ideas.43 If protect-
ing corporate speech is essential to preserving a robust public 
39. David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for 
Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 93-94. 
40. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW 161-62 (1980). Ely notes that "[a]liens cannot vote in any state, which means 
that any representation they receive will be exclusively 'virtual,''' that they have 
been the subject of substantial prejudice throughout our history, that recent immi-
grants in particular tend to live fairly discrete and unassimilated lives, and that "our 
legislatures are composed almost entirely of citizens who have always been such." 
41. While citizenship is a prerequisite to running for president or Congress, the 
political branches, it is not a requirement for appointment to the federal judiciary. 
42. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citations omitted). 
43. First Nat" Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
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debate, so too is protecting noncitizens' speech. In classrooms, 
courts, workplaces, private associations, and town hall meetings, 
noncitizens and citizens routinely find themselves side-by-side. If 
noncitizens did not have the same First Amendment rights to ex-
press themselves as citizens, the conversations in each of these 
settings would be considerably less free. If my foreign law stu-
dents were not as free as their U.S. citizen classmates to speak 
their minds, the classroom dialogue would be impoverished. 
And if Peter Jennings, until recently a Canadian citizen, were un-
able to speak as freely as Dan Rather, a United States citizen, we 
would all suffer. 
Nor does it make sense to maintain, as the United States 
government has, that foreign nationals enjoy full First Amend-
ment freedoms except when facing the immigration power. It 
makes no sense to say that a foreign national has a First Amend-
ment right to criticize government officials or to join political 
groups without fear of criminal prosecution, but that he may be 
deported for the same activities. Just as one cannot be a little bit 
pregnant, a foreign national cannot be a little bit restricted in his 
or her right to speak. If a foreign national has no First Amend-
ment rights in the deportation setting, he has no First Amend-
ment rights anywhere; the fear of deportation will always and 
everywhere restrict what he says.44 
Those who view the First Amendment as serving the ends of 
self-government might argue that because noncitizens do not 
have a right to participate directly in self-government, their ex-
pressive rights are less important to protect than those of citizens. 
But the First Amendment protects speech for a range of reasons 
not limited to informing the right to vote. Free speech furthers 
autonomy, critical thinking, self-expression, the search for truth, 
and the checking of government abuse, all interests that nonci-
tizens share equally with citizens. Corporations, minors, and 
many ex-convicts cannot vote, yet their speech rights are none-
theless protected. Moreover, the very fact that noncitizens can-
not vote but nonetheless are affected by the political decisions of 
the community in which they reside only underscores the impor-
44. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060, 
1081 (C.D. Cal. 1989) ("it is impossible to adopt for aliens a lower degree of First 
Amendment protection solely in the deportation setting without seriously affecting 
their First Amendment rights outside that setting"); American-Arab Anti-Discrimi-
nation Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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tance of protecting their speech and associational rights. At a 
minimum, those who can vote need to hear from those who can-
not if the democratic process is to have any hope of taking their 
interests into account. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses 
should also apply equally to citizens and noncitizens. If the state 
cannot take a citizen's life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law, why should it be able to take a noncitizen's life, lib-
erty or property without due process? It is generally just as much 
an imposition on a foreign national's physical freedom to be 
locked up as it is an imposition on a citizen's freedom. The gov-
ernment sometimes argues that noncitizens are entitled to dimin-
ished due process, but it is not clear why that should be SO.45 
Determining what process is constitutionally due in any given 
case requires balancing the individual's interest against the gov-
ernment's interest while considering whether the procedure 
under challenge is likely to produce erroneous results.46 Individ-
ual interests in life, liberty, and property do not usually vary de-
pending on nationality. There may be particular situations in 
which a foreign national's interests will be less substantial than a 
citizen's, but the presumption certainly ought to be that liberty is 
liberty, life is life, and property is property. Similarly, the signifi-
cance of the government's interest should not generally turn on 
the citizen/noncitizen distinction. The interest in national secur-
ity, for example, would be equally threatened by exposure of 
confidential information in a criminal case involving a citizen, a 
criminal case involving a foreign national, or an immigration pro-
ceeding. The national security interests implicated by the prose-
cution of Zacarias Moussaoui, indicted as the so-called 
"twentieth hijacker," would not be different were he a citizen, 
nor were he in immigration proceedings. Finally, the risk of er-
ror from truncated procedures will be precisely the same whether 
the individual affected is a citizen or noncitizen. Thus, the fac-
45. See, e.g., Testimony of Larry Parkinson, Deputy General Counsel, FBI, 
before H.R. Subcomm. on Immgr. of the Jud. Comm., The Secret Evidence Repeal 
Act, Hearings on H.R. 2121, 106th Congo 18,36 (Feb. 10,2000) (arguing that foreign 
nationals are entitled to diminished due process protection). 
46. Mathews V. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (establishing balancing test for de-
termining what process is due); Landon V. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (holding 
that Mathews balancing also governs what process is due in immigration 
proceedings ). 
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tors that guide due process analysis generally should not vary de-
pending on the nationality of the individual. 
The government often argues that noncitizens detained 
while in immigration proceedings have a reduced liberty interest 
because they have the right to leave the country, and therefore 
hold the "keys to the cell" in their pockets.47 In limited settings, 
this argument may have some traction, as when a foreign na-
tional is detained while seeking to enter the country from abroad 
and is perfectly free to turn around and go home. But foreign 
nationals who have lived here for any significant stretch of time 
will likely have developed educational, occupational, personal 
and community ties that make it less than a simple matter to 
leave. Immigration law affords every foreign national appre-
hended in the country the right to contest his removal, and to 
apply for various forms of relief from removal, but also provides 
that if a person chooses to leave the country while in removal 
proceedings he automatically abandons his claim to remain. Sim-
ilarly, individuals who have applied for political asylum, even at 
the borders, cannot be said to have the "keys to the cell" in their 
pockets, as their very contention is that returning home will 
likely result in their persecution. Finally, the government main-
tains the authority to deny departure to and maintain in custody 
even those foreign nationals who agree to leave, indicating that 
in fact the government ultimately holds the keys.48 Thus, the 
ability to leave the country does not generally warrant denying 
due process to noncitizens. Citizens and foreign nationals ought 
to enjoy the same due process protections. 
Equal protection is more complicated. There is no dispute 
that noncitizens are entitled to equal protection of the laws; the 
Court held as much in 1886.49 Indeed, the Court has held that 
even undocumented persons illegally here are encompassed by 
the Equal Protection Clause, ruling that Texas could not deny 
47. See, e.g., Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp.2d 402, 410 (D.N.J. 1999) (rejecting 
government's "keys to cell" argument). 
48. See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Limitations on the 
Detention Authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Feb. 20, 2003); 
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, The September 11 Detain-
ees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connec-
tion with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks (Apr. 2003, released June 
2003). 
49. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369. 
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public education to the children of "illegal aliens."5o But what 
equal protection actually means with respect to distinctions 
based on nationality, alienage or national origin is less clear. 
Equal protection, after all, does not require identical treatment 
of all persons in all matters, but only forbids different treatment 
of similarly situated persons without an adequate justification. 
Citizens and noncitizens are not similarly situated in all respects, 
and in some instances their differences will justify differential 
treatment. Most significantly, a citizen cannot be expelled from 
the country no matter how egregious his conduct, while a nonci-
tizen may be expelled even for trivial infractions. In most re-
spects, however, citizens and noncitizens are similarly situated. 
The general rule, is that where foreign nationals and citizens 
are similarly situated, they must be treated equally. Indeed, the 
Court treats alienage as a "suspect" classification, and state laws 
discriminating on the basis of alienage, nationality, or national 
origin are generally as presumptively invalid as laws discriminat-
ing along racial lines.51 There are very good reasons for this, 
given noncitizens' lack of political voice, and the history of alien-
age and nationality discrimination as a cover for racial animus 
and political repression. This rule, however, is subject to two sig-
nificant exceptions. First, because the federal immigration power 
by definition treats foreign nationals differently from citizens, 
federal discrimination on the basis of alienage in regulating im-
migration is generally permissible. As noted above, the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that "[i]n the exercise of its broad 
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly 
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."52 
But this statement should not be read too broadly. In context, it 
referred only to Congress's power to exclude and remove foreign 
50. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
51. Graham, 403 U.S. 365 (striking down under "strict scrutiny" a state statute 
denying welfare benefits to certain persons based on their immigration status). A 
distinction based on alienage differentiates between citizens and noncitizens gener-
ally; all of immigration law has at least this feature. A classification based on nation-
ality treats nationals of particular countries differently, as in laws currently on the 
books treating Cuban nationals more favorably than other immigrants. And dis-
crimination on the basis of national origin is predicated on the individual's country 
of birth, regardless of current citizenship (as in the Japanese internment laws, which 
subjected both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals of Japanese descent to internment 
during World War II). All three types of distinction are presumptively invalid when 
adopted by states. 
52. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 90. 
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nationals, a power that by definition differentiates between citi-
zens and foreign nationals.53 
Second, the Court permits states to bar foreign nationals 
from public employment connected to the administration of pub-
lic policy, including such positions as police officers, schoolteach-
ers, and even deputy probation officers.54 It reasons that a state 
may limit those who formulate and carry out public policy to 
those who are citizens of the polity. In adopting these two excep-
tions, the Court has not declared that equal protection is inappli-
cable, but only that noncitizens are differently situated from 
citizens in these areas with respect to the immigration power, be-
cause noncitizens are uniquely subject to that power; and with 
respect to self-government, because they are not necessarily part 
of the polity.55 
In short, contrary to widely held assumptions, the Constitu-
tion extends fundamental protections of due process, political 
freedoms, and equal protection to all persons subject to our laws, 
without regard to citizenship. These rights inhere in the dignity 
of the human being, and are especially necessary for people, like 
non-nationals, who have no voice in the political process. The 
rights to political participation, entry, and abode, by contrast, are 
rights that may be limited to the citizenry; they are inextricable 
from a polity's ability to define itself, and they are virtually uni-
versally recognized as legitimately limited to the citizenry. By 
contrast, there are no good reasons specific to the rights of 
speech, association, or due process that warrant diminished pro-
tection for non-nationals. While relevant differences between 
noncitizens and citizens do justify some differences in treatment, 
beyond those limited differences, noncitizens are presumptively 
entitled to equal protection of the laws. 
The notion that noncitizens are entitled to the same consti-
tutional protection for their basic human rights as citizens must 
be qualified in at least one respect. The Supreme Court has his-
53. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTI-
TUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 156 (2002)_ 
54_ Foley, 435 U-S. 291 (permitting states to require citizenship in hiring state 
troopers); Ambach, 441 U.S. 68 (permitting states to require citizenship in hiring 
public school teachers); Cabell, 454 U.S. 432 (permitting states to require citizenship 
in hiring of deputy probation officers). 
55. See Cabell, 454 U.S. at 438 (citizenship is "not a relevant ground for [state] 
distribution of economic benefits ... [but] it is for determining membership in the 
political community"). 
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torically treated foreign nationals outside our border very differ-
ently from those within our jurisdiction. As the Court recently 
noted, "it is well established that certain constitutional protec-
tions available to persons inside the United States are unavaila-
ble to aliens outside of our geographic borders. But once an 
alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the 
Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United 
States ... "56 Like plenary power, however, the notion that for-
eign nationals outside our borders enjoy no constitutional protec-
tion has often been overstated. The case most often cited for the 
proposition, United States ex. ref Knauff v. Shaughnessy,57 in-
volved a challenge to the procedures used to decide an initial 
entrant's request for admission. The Court reasoned that nonci-
tizens seeking initial entry have no right to enter, and therefore 
may not object on due process grounds to the procedures used to 
determine whether they may enter. 
That result, however, does not compel the much more 
sweeping conclusion that foreign nationals outside our borders 
have no constitutional rights whatsoever. Rather, it may simply 
reflect the proposition - equally applicable to citizens - that 
where a statute does not create an entitlement, no "liberty" or 
"property" interest is implicated by the denial of the gratuitous 
benefit it offers, and therefore due process does not attach.58 
Since the Court treated Knauff as having no entitlement to enter, 
but as merely seeking a benefit, she had neither a liberty nor a 
property interest sufficient to trigger due process protection, just 
as a convicted prisoner has no liberty or property interest in a 
discretionary pardon from the governor, and therefore may not 
challenge the procedures by which pardons are granted. Where, 
by contrast, the government is not merely denying foreign na-
tionals outside of our borders a gratuitous benefit, but affirma-
tively subjecting them to the obligations of our legal system, they 
should reciprocally receive the protection of the constitutional 
56. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (citations omitted). 
57. 338 U.S. 537. 
58. See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1983) (holding that state 
prison regulations did not create a liberty interest implicated by a transfer to another 
state, and therefore due process was not triggered); Board of Regents of State Col-
leges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,578 (1972) (holding that an untenured professor had no 
property interest in being rehired and therefore no due process objection to the 
procedures used to reach that decision). 
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limits on such government action.59 On this view, while a deci-
sion to deny initial entry to a foreign national might not trigger 
due process, because he has no independent right to enter, a de-
cision to detain an entering non-national would trigger due pro-
cess, because detention affirmatively deprives the person of 
physical liberty, and "[f]reedom from imprisonment ... lies at the 
heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects."60 
Admittedly, Knauff and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rei. 
Mezei,61 suggest that detention of arriving foreign visitors does 
not change the constitutional calculus, but in that respect they 
are wrongly decided, because detention cannot be equated with 
the mere denial of a benefit.62 
To assert that noncitizens are entitled to substantially the 
same constitutional rights protections as citizens is not to assert 
that these rights are absolutes, or that the Constitution is a sui-
cide pact. With the exception of the bans on slavery and torture, 
most constitutional rights are not absolutes, but presumptive pro-
tections that may be overridden by compelling showings of gov-
ernmental need and narrow tailoring. Thus, for example, the 
First Amendment creates a strong presumption of protection for 
speech, but that presumption is overridden where the speech is 
intended and likely to incite imminent lawless action.63 My claim 
is not that such categorical balancing is inappropriate, but that 
we should not cheat on the balance by drawing the line differ-
ently for non-nationals and citizens. While the definition of most 
constitutional rights contains an implicit consequentialist bal-
ance, the balance should be struck equally for all - even if it 
might appear convenient or politically tempting to strike it differ-
ently for some. 
59. See NEUMAN, supra note 18, at 108-17 (arguing that aliens should have consti-
tutional rights abroad where the United States imposes its sovereign legal obliga-
tions on them). 
60. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 
(1992) ("[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of lib-
erty that requires due process protection"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923) ("Without doubt, [liberty] denotes ... freedom from bodily restraint."). 
61. 345 U.S. 206. 
62. See David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration De-
tention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1031-37 (2002). 
63. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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III. LOYALTY, PLENARY POWER, THE RIGHT/ 
PRIVILEGE DISTINCTION, AND THE 
VALUE OF CITIZENSHIP 
Defenders of exceptional government power over nonci-
tizens nonetheless offer several arguments for not extending the 
same rights to foreigners that we extend to citizens. Foreign na-
tionals have taken no oath of loyalty to this country and presum-
ably maintain their principal fidelity elsewhere. While citizens 
have a right to permanent residence in the United States, foreign 
nationals have no constitutional right to reside here. The politi-
cal branches' broad authority over immigration justifies dimin-
ished rights in the immigration setting. Foreign nationals come 
and live among us as our guests, on whatever conditions we set. 
And if we were to extend to foreign nationals the same rights 
that citizens enjoy, we would devalue citizenship itself. For these 
reasons, it is said, treating foreign nationals differently does not 
violate basic norms of equality and dignity, but simply reflects 
that they are in fact different.64 
None of these arguments warrants affording diminished con-
stitutional protection to non-nationals residing among us. Loy-
alty is a red herring. Most citizens became citizens by the 
a<;:cident of birth, not by passing any test of commitment. Non-
nationals choose to come here, while most citizens were simply 
born here and did not leave.65 Presumptive loyalties to other na-
tions are especially irrelevant in the war on terrorism, where our 
adversary is not a nation, but a criminal organization, and is in-
deed a common adversary of many of the Arab and Muslim na-
tions whose citizens the government has targeted. Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, and Egypt, for example, are among our most important 
allies in the war on terrorism, yet their citizens have been dis-
criminatorily subjected to registration, interviews, detentions, 
and deportations. 
Perhaps the most common argument for reduced constitu-
tional protection for noncitizens invokes what the Supreme 
Court has called the political branches' "plenary power" over im-
64. The issue here is not whether it makes sense to focus on Arab and Muslim 
foreign nationals in the search for AI Qaeda operatives. The question posed here is 
broader: Are noncitizens living in the United States, or otherwise subjected to 
American legal obligations, entitled to the same basic constitutional protections as 
citizens, or do they deserve only diminished constitutional safeguards? 
65. RUBIO-MARIN, supra note 29, at 52. 
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migration.66 The doctrine, founded on notions of the sovereign's 
inherent power to control its borders, counsels considerable judi-
cial deference in reviewing the substantive terms Congress sets 
for admission. But the plenary power doctrine is frequently 
overstated and has been narrowed by Supreme Court decisions. 
In 2001, for example, the Court summarily rejected the govern-
ment's assertion of plenary power in a case involving indefinite 
detention of criminal non-nationals, insisting that the plenary 
power "is subject to important constitutional limitations."67 
In particular, the plenary immigration power does not justify 
differential treatment of foreign nationals' First Amendment 
speech and associational rights or Fifth Amendment due process 
rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court has insisted that the First and 
Fifth Amendments acknowledge no distinctions between citizens 
and noncitizens residing here.68 When the United States govern-
ment argued in the Cold War that Congress had plenary power to 
deport foreign nationals for their speech and associations, the 
Court declined to adopt that contention, but instead upheld the 
challenged immigration law under the then-prevailing First 
Amendment standard for citizens.69 Similarly, with one excep-
tion, the Court has generally applied the same due process analy-
sis to preventive detention of foreigners in immigration 
proceedings and of citizens in criminal and civil commitment set-
tings, treating the cases interchangeably.70 
66. See, e.g., Piallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977) (quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. at 
81-82); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603-06. The plenary power doctrine 
has been subject to widespread criticism. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRA-
TION AND THE JUDICIARY; LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 177-222 
(1987); NEUMAN, supra note 18, at 118-38; Louis Henkin, The Constitution and 
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987). 
67. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695; see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 
(1952) (noting that "the power to expel aliens ... is, of course, subject to judicial 
intervention under the 'paramount law of the Constitution.'" (citations omitted». 
68. Chew, supra note 5, at 596 n.5 (1953). 
69. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Dennis v. United States, 341 
U.S. 494 (1951); see American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. 
Supp. at 1077-78; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and 
the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 869 (1989). 
70. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (relying on United States v. Salerno, 481 
U.S. 739 (1987), involving the preventive detention of a citizen in criminal proceed-
ings, and Foucha, 504 U.S. 71, involving preventive detention of citizen in civil com-
mitment proceeding). See generally Cole, supra note 62; see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 
748 (citing Carlson, 342 U.S. 524, as support for permitting preventive detention in 
some circumstances in criminal cases). 
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The one exception is the Court's 2003 decision in Demore v. 
Kim, which upheld a statute mandating preventive detention 
during deportation proceedings of foreign nationals charged with 
certain criminal offenses.71 Under the statute, even persons who 
pose no risk of flight and no danger to the community must be 
detained. In a five-to-four decision, the Court pointed to statis-
tics showing that significant percentages of "criminal aliens" 
committed more crime upon release and/or failed to appear for 
their deportation hearings, and reasoned that Congress could 
therefore make a categorical judgment that no such persons 
should be released on bond while in deportation proceedings. 
The decision marks the first time outside of a war setting that the 
Court has upheld preventive detention of anyone without an in-
dividualized assessment of the necessity of such detention. And 
the majority expressly rested its decision on a double standard, 
noting that Congress can make rules in the immigration setting 
that would be unacceptable for citizens. But the Court failed to 
explain the double standard's extension to preventive detention. 
As noted above, the liberty interests of the detainee and the gov-
ernment's interests in preventing flight or danger to the commu-
nity are no different for noncitizens in immigration proceedings 
than for citizens in criminal proceedings. Demore thus asserts, 
but does not justify, differential treatment of foreign nationals' 
due process rights. 
A third argument commonly heard as a rationale for afford-
ing noncitizens less robust rights protection maintains that be-
cause noncitizens are only "guests"72 who have "come at the 
Nation's invitation,'>73 their admission and continuing presence 
may be conditioned on whatever constraints the government 
chooses to impose. As the Supreme Court once put it, deporta-
tion "is simply a refusal by the Government to harbor persons 
whom it does not want. ,,74 If you don't like it, the argument 
goes, either don't come, or get out. This argument seeks to trans-
form what we generally think of as inalienable rights into discre-
tionary privileges that can be granted or denied at will. It uses 
the fact that a foreign national's entry is a privilege to recast re-
71. Demore, 538 U.S. 510. 
72. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80. 
73. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 534; Foley, 435 U.S. at 294. 
74. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 592 (1913). 
386 
HeinOnline -- 25 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 387 2002-2003
2003] FOREIGN NATIONALS 
strictions on his or her rights here as conditions on the privilege 
of entry. 
This argument proves too much. It would negate virtually 
all constitutional rights of noncitizens, and relegate an entire 
class of the populace to a wholly unprotected status. A law man-
dating detention of all noncitizens who marry noncitizens of 
other races, for example, would be immune from due process, 
privacy, and equal protection challenges because it could be de-
fended as a mere condition on noncitizens' entry. The Supreme 
Court has rejected such reasoning, in the immigration area and 
elsewhere, precisely because it would allow the government to 
achieve indirectly, by attaching conditions to benefits, what it 
cannot achieve directly. As the Court stated in 1971 in a case 
involving noncitizen rights, "this Court has now rejected the con-
cept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental 
benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege."'7s Under 
contemporary constitutional law, equal protection prohibits in-
vidious discrimination in the allocation of benefits as well as of 
rights, and the Court's "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine 
provides that the government acts unconstitutionally when even 
wholly discretionary benefits are denied because of the recipi-
ent's exercise of constitutional rights.76 Thus, the right-privilege 
distinction does not justify a denial of immigrants' rights. 
Finally, some warn that extending substantially equal rights 
to foreign nationals will dilute the value of United States citizen-
ship, and thereby create fewer incentives for immigrants to be-
come naturalized citizens.77 Citizenship would undoubtedly be 
more attractive if basic protections against government intrusions 
on privacy, equality, liberty, and life were available exclusively or 
in more generous measure to citizens. But devaluing human be-
ings' basic rights is an illegitimate means toward that end. As 
75. Graham, 403 U.S. at 374. 
76. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991) (characterizing "unconsti-
tutional condition" cases as involving "situations in which the Government has 
placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular pro-
gram or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the pro-
tected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program"); Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) ("For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a 
State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's 
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression"). 
77. See, e.g., PETER SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS 
ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP (NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, CULTURE, AND 
SOCIETY) (1998). 
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long as citizens alone are afforded the rights to vote, to take part 
in the political process of self-government, and to permanent 
abode, rights traditionally limited to citizens the world over, 
there seems little danger that citizenship will be devalued in any 
deeply troubling way. 
Thus, there is little reasoned support for the widely held no-
tion that noncitizens are entitled to substantially less constitu-
tional protection than citizens. While not identically situated in 
all respects, foreign nationals should enjoy the same constitu-
tional protections for fundamental rights and liberties as United 
States citizens. The areas of permissible differentiation - admis-
sion, expUlsion, voting, and running for federal elective office -
are much narrower than the areas of presumptive equality - due 
process, freedom of expression, association, and religion, privacy, 
and the rights of the criminally accused. 
When we balance liberty and security, in other words, we 
should respect the equal dignity and basic human rights of all 
persons. In the wake of September 11, we have failed to follow 
that mandate. When we spy on foreign nationals without proba-
ble cause but not citizens, selectively target foreign nationals for 
registration, detention, and deportation based on their ethnic and 
religious identities, and lock up foreign nationals in secret or 
without any hearings at all, we have chosen the easy way out: 
sacrificing their rights for our purported security. In the end, the 
true test of justice in a democratic society is not how it treats 
those with political power, but how it treats those who have no 
voice in the democratic process. How we treat foreign nationals, 
the paradigmatic other in this time of crisis, ultimately tests our 
own humanity. 
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